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LICENSE TO KILL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
LEGALITY OF FULLY AUTONOMOUS
DRONES IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE LAW
Andrew Figueroa*

ABSTRACT
We live in a world of constant technological change; and with this
change, comes unknown effects and consequences. This is even truer
with weapons and warfare. Indeed, as the means and methods of
warfare rapidly modify and transform, the effects and consequences
on the laws of war are unknown. This Article addresses one such
development in weapon and warfare technology—Fully
Autonomous Weapons or “Killer Robots”—and discusses the
inevitable use of these weapons within the current international law
framework. Recognizing the current, inadequate legal framework,
this Article proposes a regulation policy to mitigate the risks
associated with Fully Autonomous Weapons. But the debate should
not end here; States and the U.N. must work together to adopt a
legal framework that coincides with the advancement of technology.
This Article starts that discussion.

*J.D. 2017, Florida International University College of Law. A special
thanks to the editors of the Pace International Law Review for publishing my
Article.
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[W]ar is still, somehow, a rule-governed activity, a world of
permissions and prohibitions—a moral world, therefore, in the midst of
hell.
––Michael Walzer1

Are we going to let the fact that these [new technologies] look like
science fiction, sound like science fiction, and feel like science fiction, keep
us in denial that these are battlefield reality? Are we going to be like a
previous generation that looked at another science fiction-like technology,
the atomic bomb? The name “atomic bomb” and the concept come from
an H.G. Wells short story. Indeed, the very concept of the nuclear chain
reaction also came from that same sci-fi short story. Are we going to be
like that past generation that looked at this stuff and said, “We don’t have
to wrestle with all the moral, social, and ethical issues that come out of it
until after Pandora’s box is open?”
––Peter Singer2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of human existence to the present date,
war has certainly been part of the human condition.3 As warfare
continues to evolve, the means and methods of warfare follow the
same course.4 Indeed, military technology is driven by constant
change—each actor in pursuit of being better, faster, and stronger.5
This constant development of technology raises difficult legal
questions concerning the laws of war. Specifically, “[n]ew

1

MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS:
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 36 (5th ed. 2015).

A MORAL ARGUMENT

2

P.W. Singer, Ethical Implications of Military Robotics, The 2009
William C. Stutt Ethics Lecture 19 (Mar. 25, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/usna_singer_robot_ethics.pdf).
3
Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan, the Law
of War and the Legality of the Drone Attacks, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1, 1 (2011).
4
Id.
5
Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous
Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 274 (2011).

3
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technology has often moved faster than the laws of war.”6 One of
the most recent developments in warfare, and highly controversial,
is the legality of employing drones to target enemies. The
discussion, however, does not end there.
In the past decade, technological developments have
dramatically increased the number and variety of drones.7 With the
improving technologies and capabilities, the drone debate shifts to
the impact and legality of computer-automated drones, or “killer
robots”—fully autonomous killing machines that select and engage
targets without human input—as a means of employing justified use
of force.8 Indeed, the modernization of military robotics, with
autonomous decision-making capability, is a recent development
that has largely escaped public debate, leaving a host of unanswered
international use of force questions.9 Does the use of these types of
drones change the implications of the laws of war? Can autonomous
decision-making drones be a justifiable use of force under the
current international law framework? Who will be accountable for
the unjustified use of these drones? These never-before anticipated
and complex legal questions will be at the forefront of an extensive
and intense debate once fully autonomous weapons are fully
employed in the battlefield.10
The hesitation of employing fully autonomous weapons
(“FAWs”) is due to fear that these weapons will reduce costs and
allow warfare to become too easy, which will result in swelled kill
lists and ultimately, a short-circuit in the decision-making process.11
6

P. W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND
CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 387 (2009).
7
Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law
of War, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 675, 678 (2012).
8
BONNIE DOCHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE
CASE
AGAINST
KILLER
ROBOTS
(Nov.
19,
2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killerrobots.
9
See generally Marchant et al., supra note 5 (discussing various
questions raised).
10
See generally Blank, supra note 7, at 679 (discussing the questions
raised by the use of drones in war and as a means of targeted killings).
11
Peter W. Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/dodrones-undermine-democracy.html.
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In particular, a State’s decision to use force “used to be the most
important choice a democracy could make,” but now, FAWs can be
employed with minimal human intervention and swiftly, without
“any actual political debate.”12 The unexpected consequences,
however, are difficult to analyze since these autonomous weapons
have yet to be employed in their full capacity.13 But the fear of
robotic warfare, machine takeover, and Terminator innuendos,14
must not be the sole basis for prohibiting the development and use
of FAWs. This Article discusses the inevitable use of these weapons
and proposes that all States work together to adopt a framework to
regulate these new technologies. Indeed, FAWs are not the problem,
it is the de minimis threshold that allows States to deploy force
without any legal ramifications or accountability. Ultimately, this
Article, after applying the use of FAWs to the current legal
justifications for force, proposes a regulation policy to mitigate the
risks associated with FAWs.
This Article will not solely concentrate on U.S. baseddevelopment or U.S. perspectives, but instead, will focus on the
international spectrum of autonomous weapons and the implications
on international use of force law. In four sections, this Article will
discuss: (I) a brief discussion of the history of drones and FAWs,
with a discussion of policy perspectives and current legal
challenges; (II) a review of current and different viewpoints on the
issue; (III) an individualized explanation on the legality of
employing FAWs with respect to established international use of
force justifications; and (IV) a policy proposal concerning the future
use of these weapons in regard to international use of force.

12

Id.
See Jay Logan Rogers, Note, Legal Judgment Day for the Rise of the
Machines: A National Approach to Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 1257, 1269–70 (2014) (noting that some militaries may currently
be using automated robots, but that these militaries still operate these robots with
human monitoring and oversight).
14
SINGER, supra note 6, at 416.
13

5
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II. DRONES AND FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS:
HISTORY, POLICY, AND CHALLENGES
A. Background on Drones and Fully Autonomous Weapon
Systems
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
President George W. Bush authorized the use of drones against
leaders of al-Qaeda forces pursuant to Congress’ Authorization for
Use of Military Force.15 In addition, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously passed a resolution that recognized the U.S.’ right to
self-defense and gave direct authorization for it to enter Afghanistan
and use force against the suspected terrorists.16 The implication of
the 2001 terrorist attacks is that the use of drones, as a weapon of
war, was unleashed.17 Thereafter, drone strikes drastically increased
as a result of al-Qaeda and its affiliated terror groups reconstituting
in the Pakistani tribal areas.18 Prior to the Bush Administration’s
employment of drones as a weapon of war, drones were utilized
exclusively for intelligence gathering and surveillance.19 Drones
have, however, become the weapon of choice to target and kill
terrorists.20 Specifically, President Obama, in his first-year of office
15

Milena Sterio, The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror:
The (Il)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law, 45 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 197, 198 (2012); see also Gregory S. McNeal, Responses to the Ten
Questions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5113, 5114 (2010) (noting that pursuant to
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, President George W. Bush had
authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determine[d] planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks”).
16
Eveylon Corrie Westbrook Mack, Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPAS)
in Targeted Killing Operations: The United States is No Lone Wolf, 26 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 447, 466 (2014).
17
See Sterio, supra note 15, at 198; see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106–398, § 220(a)(2), 114
Stat. 1654, 1654A–38 (2000) (mandating that by 2015 one-third of operational
ground combat vehicles and aircraft be unmanned).
18
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 9.
19
Susan Breau & Marie Aronsson, Drone Attacks, International Law,
and the Recording of Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict, 35 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 255, 255 (2012).
20
Id.
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alone, reportedly carried out more drone strikes than the previous
eight years combined under President Bush.21 Indeed, drones were
the poster child of President Obama’s fight against terrorism.22
Although the U.S.’ drone program is the most expansive, the
U.S. is not the only country to possess this technology.23 State and
non-State actors reportedly possess drones, including the United
Kingdom, France, Russia, Turkey, India, China, Hezbollah, Israel,
and Iran.24 This continued technological development will make it
unavoidable and certain that more States and non-State actors will
also soon possess drone weapon technology.25
With the
proliferation of technological developments in the military context,
States will certainly shift to acquiring and developing FAWs and
ultimately, deploying these weapons in the battlefield.26
Militaries around the world, including the U.S., have
devoted many resources and efforts in acquiring FAWs, and are
currently in the process of producing such weapons.27 Peter Singer,
a known expert on the proliferation of robotic weapons, indicates
that “besides the U.S., there are 43 other nations that are also
building, buying and using military robotics today.”28 In fact, to
date, several military robotic-automation systems are capable of
21

Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 105 (2010); see also David W. Opderbeck, Drone
Courts, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 413, 421 (2014) (discussing President Obama’s criteria
for drone strikes).
22
Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?,
67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
23
See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Remarks: The Resort to Drones Under
International Law, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 585, 586 (2011).
24
Id. (noting a United Press International report that indicated Israel has
sold drones to over 42 States).
25
See Westbrook Mack, supra note 16, at 460 (reporting the number of
countries that have obtained unmanned aerial vehicle technology is approximately
seventy-six).
26
SINGER, supra note 6, at 128 (“[A]utonomous robots on the battlefield
will be the norm within twenty years.”).
27
Rogers, supra note 13, at 1258.
28
Steve Kanigher, Author talks about military robotics and the changing
face of war, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:01 AM)
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2011/mar/17/military-robotics-and-changing-facewar/ (question and answer interview format with Peter Singer).

7
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sensing their environment and actuating; however, human
involvement is still present as humans are the last line of decision
making and ultimately responsible for deploying lethal force.29
Based on these trends, many experts believe that FAWs are
inevitable and imminent as the future weapons of war.30
The U.S. Department of Defense defines an autonomous
weapon system as a “system that, once activated, can select and
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”31
The key difference between an autonomous weapon system and a
remotely-controlled drone is that human input activation is required
in the latter.32 A hypothetical example of a FAW is a drone that can
identify and carry out a strike without human intervention (i.e.,
without a remote pilot or crew), but based on cues from the
surroundings, quantitative algorithms, and threat level
determinations.33 Indeed, these weapon systems, once activated,
would be capable of making their own decisions without human
intervention.34 The core of full autonomy is “the capability to
identify, target, and attack a person or object without human
interface.”35
B. Policy
From a policy perspective, FAWs are extremely appealable
to the State attempting to engage and target enemies.36 Specifically,
armed drones permit targeted killings with little to no risk to a
State’s military personnel, they limit military personnel’s exposure
29

See Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 276.
Id.
31
Daniel N. Hammond, Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State
Accountability, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 652, 658–59 (2015) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09: AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13 (Nov. 21, 2012)).
32
Id. at 659.
33
Id.
34
See id.
35
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”:
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 231, 235 (2013).
36
Philip Alston (Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions), Study on targeted killings, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010).
30
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to hostile terrain, and can be remotely operated in the home State—
granted that this perk will be eliminated with FAWs.37 In addition,
the use of FAWs allows a home-State to focus its operations by
targeting and engaging specified targets, with the intention of
forcing the enemy to abandon key access points and preventing
future terrorist attacks, as opposed to amassing ground forces for a
physical invasion.38 The ways of war are evolving, with the strategy
turning to engaging in military power quickly, decisively, and with
minimal casualties.39 Additional policy benefits include “flexibility
for expanded missions, complete safety for human operators, fewer
manning and training costs, and vast new attack capabilities.”40
C. Challenges Posed by the Issue
Many of the dangers and challenges associated with FAWs
currently exist in today’s deployed weapon systems.41 Although a
State can exercise force whenever it chooses, and by whatever
means, there still remains questions of whether its actions are legal
and justifiable. Additional challenges arise when the level of human
intervention becomes more diminished and uncertain, which in
effect, increases the role of computers and machines.42 The debate
then shifts from the question of whether it is lawful to use drones in
targeted killings, to whether it is lawful to use FAWs to select and
target enemies without human intervention.43 There are two ends of
the spectrum when analyzing the legality of FAWs: the advocates of
their use and the critics, each side raising strong arguments.44
However, in the middle of all this debate there is one absolute—the
37

Id.
See Gross, supra note 22, at 24–25.
39
See id. at 24 (comparing United States’ old strategy of war to its new
strategy).
40
Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45
GEO. J. INT’L L. 617, 624 (2014).
41
Id. at 620.
42
See id.
43
See Tetyana Krupiy, Of Souls, Spirits and Ghosts: Transposing the
Application of the Rules of Targeting to Lethal Autonomous Robots, 16 MELB. J.
INT’L L. 145, 146 (2015).
44
See Rogers, supra note 13, at 1259.
38

9
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law of conflict has lagged far behind the current, and future, methods
of warfare.45 Indeed, the main challenge is the certainty that the
advancement of technology will outpace international legal
developments.46
In today’s international realm, no laws or treaties exist that
specifically pertain to the prohibition or governance of FAWs,47
which undoubtedly is the biggest challenge posed by the
technological development of FAWs.48 Specifically, “[t]his new
technology creates new pressure points for international law . . .
[States] will be trying to apply international law written for the
Second War to Star Trek technology.”49 A 2013 U.N. Report
concluded that autonomous weapons should be approached with
“great caution,”50 and recommended establishing an international
body to “monitor the situation and articulate the options for the
longer term.”51 There still remains conflict in different jurisdictions
in determining whether these weapons should be developed,
regulated, or completely prohibited.52 For example, States such as
Costa Rica and Pakistan have decided to completely prohibit the
development of FAWs;53 South Korea, Israel, and Russia reportedly
deploy FAWs to assist in border and military base patrol;54 while
the U.S. persists in further development of these weapons and will
inevitably employ this technology in the battlefield.55
45

Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict:
Ostriches, Butterflies, and Nanobots, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 253, 254–57 (2014)
(discussing the difficulty analyzing the law of armed conflict and the future
development of methods of warfare).
46
See Bradan T. Thomas, Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Anatomy
of Autonomy and the Legality of Lethality, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 235, 246 (2015).
47
Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289.
48
SINGER, supra note 6, at 387.
49
Id. (emphasis in original).
50
Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, Lethal autonomous robotics (LARs), ¶ 109, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013).
51
Id. ¶ 112.
52
See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1839–40 (2015).
53
Krupiy, supra note 43, at 146.
54
See Crootof, supra note 52, at 1839–40.
55
Krupiy, supra note 43, at 146.
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To address these challenges, international law must develop
an effective legal doctrine concerning the future use of this force.56
Indeed, there are minimal doctrines concerning FAWs today;
instead, aspects of FAWs are covered only by piecemeal legislation
pertaining to the projection and prospects of future use of this force
under international law.57 There must be a guiding principle or
vision.58 As military technology develops, there have been multiple
conventions in international law purporting to address new weapons
and practices. These include agreements about “biological
weapons, chemical weapons, certain types of ammunition, the
hostile use of environmental modification, land mines, incendiary
weapons, blinding laser weapons and numerous others.”59 Now, is
the time to fully to address the best practices to govern FAWs, and
to determine whether this type of force will “maintain international
peace and security” among nations or whether it will contradict the
underlying principles of the U.N. Charter.60
III. CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON THE ISSUE
A. Advocates of Fully Autonomous Weapons
Advocates of FAWs assert that there is one clear trend in
international affairs: “warfare will continue and autonomous
weapons will ultimately be deployed in its conduct.”61 The reality
that war is unavoidable fuels a desire to make warfare less horrific,
minimize civilian casualties, and allow for better enforcement of
international law principles.62 Advocates do not focus on the
56

SINGER, supra note 6, at 210.
See Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289.
58
SINGER, supra note 6, at 210.
59
Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289–90; see also id. (noting the United
States is not a party to any of these conventions).
60
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
61
RONALD C. ARKIN, GEOR. INST. OF TECH., GOVERNING LETHAL
BEHAVIOR: EMBEDDING ETHICS IN A HYBRID DELIBERATIVE/REACTIVE ROBOT
ARCHITECTURE
6,
https://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/onlinepublications/formalizationv35.pdf.
62
Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for
Developing Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 189, 244–
45 (2015).
57

11
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“science fiction” characterization that these weapons will create an
environment of all out robotic warfare.63 Instead, advocates focus
on the benefits of human soldiers coexisting with autonomous
weapons64—a team, with autonomous robots having the “potential
capability of independently and objectively monitoring ethical
behavior.”65
The crux of the advocates’ claims is this notion of “riskless
war” and “wars without casualties.”66 By deploying FAWs, humans
will no longer be at the forefront of the battlefield; therefore, there
will be a significant reduction in the number of military personnel
killed or wounded when engaging identified targets.67 In addition,
these weapons will be better equipped to comply with international
laws because FAWs’ sensors will be able to identify enemies with
more precision.68 By engaging targets with higher accuracy, it is
more likely that innocent civilians will be safe from an authorized
attack.69 Marc Garlasco, a senior military analyst at Human Rights
Watch, pointed out that precision guided technologies can help save
lives because these “[weapons] allow far greater discrimination in
targeting and save civilian lives as a result.”70
B. Critics of Fully Autonomous Weapons
Critics of FAWs focus on the uncertainty and
unpredictability of these weapons, and their prospective uses in the
battlefield. It is well-established that “[c]omplex systems are prone
to component failures and malfunctions, and to intermodule
inconsistencies and misunderstandings.”71
Critics of FAWs
emphasize the unpredictability of the software and the lack of
63

ARKIN, supra note 61, at 5.
Id.
65
Id. at 6–7.
66
Heyns, supra note 50, ¶ 86.
67
Rogers, supra note 13, at 1259.
68
Id. at 1259–60.
69
Id.
70
SINGER, supra note 6, at 388.
71
Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 283–84 (quoting Roger Clarke,
Asimov's Laws of Robotics Implications for Information Technology-Part II, 27
COMPUTER 57, 65 (1994)).
64
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awareness of the risks associated with employing FAWs.72 Some
critics argue that FAWs will never comply with the lawful use of
force and, therefore, are inherently unlawful.73 Other critics raise
hypothetical concerns like: (1) FAWs being vulnerable to hacking,
which may lead to non-State actors intercepting FAWs; (2) FAWs’
possible inability to select and engage targets, which may result in
catastrophic errors; (3) the continued technological developments
may increase the military utility of a weapon; and (4) the prospect
of targeted killings by FAWs may lead to animosity and future
terrorist attacks.74
Additionally, critics also warn that the full-scale
development of FAWs “risk[s] setting off a global arms race.”75
This arms race would lead to FAWs being available at a cheap price,
which would allow FAWs to be readily available to rogue States and
violent extremists.76 In fact, “this reduced cost may, in turn, reduce
the rigor with which non-violent alternatives are pursued and thus
encourage
unnecessary—and
therefore
unjust—wars.”77
Ultimately, the critics either call for a complete prohibition or, in the
alternative, impose stringent regulations on FAWs.
IV. THE LAWS OF WAR: USING FAWS IN THE CONTEXT OF USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The laws of war establish principles and parameters that
allow a State to legally and justifiably employ use of force.78
Although the laws of war are separated into two distinct categories,
“Jus ad Bellum,” Latin for the “right to wage war,” is only discussed
herein.79 Jus ad Bellum is characterized as the set of rules that
72

Id. at 284.
See Crootof, supra note 52, at 1872–73.
74
Heyns, supra note 50, ¶ 98.
75
Matthew Rosenberg & John Markoff, The Pentagon’s ‘Terminator
Conundrum’: Robots That Could Kill on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligenceterminator.html.
76
Id.
77
Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 285.
78
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 2–3.
79
Id.
73
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govern a State’s legal right to use military force and engage in
warfare.80 Today, the U.N. Charter, which prescribes the governing
laws of the initiation of war,81 is the modern codification of the
principles of Jus ad Bellum.82
The U.N. Charter emphatically begins with its principle
purposes: “To maintain international peace and security” 83 and “[t]o
develop friendly relations among nations.”84 In order to maintain
peace and security, the U.N. Charter prescribes general principles
and a structured framework for governing the laws of war.
Specifically, the U.N. Charter codifies a general prohibition on the
use of force and declares that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”85 However, this is not an absolute prohibition. There are
narrow exceptions that do not constitute a breach of a State’s
sovereignty or an unjustified use of force.86 First, a State is
authorized to use force upon the Security Council’s authorization to
maintain security and peace.87 Second, a State has an inherent right
of self-defense to respond to an “armed attack,” which raises the
question of expanding this right to preemptive or anticipatory selfdefense.88 There remains other possible legally, cognizable
80

Justin Desautels-Stein, The Judge and the Drone, 56 ARIZ. L. REV.
117, 167 (2014).
81
See James A.R. Nafziger, Going to War and Going Ahead with the
Law, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 321, 346 (2014).
82
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 4.
83
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
84
Id. ¶ 2.
85
Id. art. 2, ¶ 4.
86
Michael N. Schmitt, Narrowing the International Law Divide: The
Drone Debate Matures, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2014); see also Larson
& Malamud, supra note 3, at 16–19 (discussing the United States’ anticipatory
self-defense justification for drone strikes in Pakistan following the U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan).
87
Schmitt, supra note 86, at 3.
88
Molly McNab & Megan Matthews, Clarifying the Law Relating to
Unmanned Drones and the Use of Force: The Relationships Between Human
Rights, Self-Defense, Armed Conflict, and International Humanitarian Law, 39
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 661, 664 (2011).
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arguments for when a State may justifiably use force, including
consent of territorially invaded States, ungoverned territory, and hot
pursuit.89
The non-existent legal framework surrounding FAWs is a
prime example of technology outpacing the laws of war. In the
absence of any treaty or the United Nation’s prohibitions on FAWs,
this Article shifts focus to current justifications for using
international force to evaluate the lawfulness of the future use of
these weapons, including: U.N. Security Council resolutions; selfdefense—including preemptive or anticipatory self-defense;
consent of territorially invaded States; ungoverned territory; and hot
pursuit. Specifically, focusing on the application of these legal
justifications to FAWs and, ultimately, proposing a legal and policy
approach to regulate and govern this fast-paced development of
technology, which will impact international use of force laws.
A. U.N. Security Council Resolutions
A State is authorized to use force when the U.N. Security
Council invokes its authority under the U.N. Charter.90 Specifically,
the Security Council is authorized to take “such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”91 With respect to its permitted authority, the Security
Council has authorized the deployment of military personnel to
resist acts of aggression and restore peace.92 Additionally, a U.N.
Security Council’s resolution increases transparency and legitimacy
of the right of a State to use force.93
The U.N. Security Council has authorized a State’s use of
force in different circumstances, depending on the existing threat or
breach of peace.94 This can drastically increase, however, with
States deploying FAWs. Specifically, under what circumstances
89

See generally Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 11–21.
William H. Taft, IV, International Law and the Use of Force, 36 GEO.
J. INT’L L. 659, 661 (2005).
91
U.N. Charter art. 51.
92
Taft, IV, supra note 90, at 661.
93
Hitomi Takemura, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Humanization from
International Humanitarian Law, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 521, 530 (2014).
94
U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41.
90
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would another States’ deployment of FAWs into another States’
territory constitute a threat or breach of peace. This is what
transpires when we are the target. Instead of opening the floodgates
of States seeking authorization for attacking or deploying FAWs,
the U.N. Security Council must pass resolutions setting forth
guidelines that specifically address the use of FAWs.95 These
resolutions must reaffirm the principles of the laws of war in the
international arena. With the potential of the current legal
framework lagging behind the use of FAWs, there is a quandary
when States deploy FAWs with no intention of using force or
breaching the peace, which then leads a host State, reluctant to
extend the invitation, portraying this invasion of territory as an act
of aggression. Ultimately, FAWs will inevitably pose a threat to a
host State, which may lead to States constantly seeking an
authorization to use force against the FAWs because of the nonexistent guidelines or principles.
B. Self-Defense—Including Preemptive or Anticipatory SelfDefense
Although the U.N. Charter codifies a general prohibition on
the use of force, it also recognizes that a State has an inherent and
collective right to self-defense in response to an armed attack.96
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter stipulates, “[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the U.N.,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”97 There is much leeway granted
to a State to defend themselves preemptively and without having
suffered the first blow.98 The deployment of FAWs would make the
“armed attack” requirement of Article 51 obsolete because these
weapons will be capable of identifying an attack before it happens—
95

See Edieth Y. Wu, Drones in the Fight Against Terrorism—Should the
Global Community Stringently Regulate Their Use?, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 273,
295 (2015).
96
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 4.
97
U.N. Charter art. 51.
98
Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States That Might
Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2009).
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i.e., a preemptive or an anticipatory measure to safeguard a State
from an “imminent attack.”99
Although FAWs may be capable of preventing an imminent
attack, States must not expand the self-defense doctrine to allow for
unauthorized cross-border incursions or unauthorized killings.100
Instead, the focus should be on the FAWs ability to prevent
catastrophic destruction and the loss of life. For example, FAWs
will be capable of identifying explosive devices in the battlefield or
in terrorist prone areas and, therefore, will be able to eliminate these
devices and threats without the killing or maiming of civilians.101
The problem with a preemptive or an anticipatory attack is the
notion that States will unjustifiably attack targets without there
being an actual, imminent threat. FAWs will allow for a different
application of this doctrine because FAWs will focus on the means
and methods that kill, instead of the targeting of an alleged terrorist.
Ultimately, justifying force on the basis of preemptive or
anticipatory self-defense must be limited in all circumstances;
however, FAWs will change the application of this doctrine because
FAWs will be capable of intercepting an attack, as opposed to
anticipating an armed attack.102
C. Consent of the Territorially Invaded State
Another viable use of force justification for using FAWs in
another State’s territory is to obtain consent from the host State.103
Once a State obtains consent, its conduct becomes lawful, even
though its conduct would be unlawful if conducted without
permission.104 “[I]nternational law today does not clearly prohibit
states from using consent as a partial or complete rationale for their
forcible actions in another state’s territory, even where that consent
purports to authorize an activity that the host state legally could not

99

Takemura, supra note 93, at 528–29.
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 4.
101
Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 289.
102
McNab & Matthews, supra note 88, at 682–83.
103
Zora Ahmed, Strengthening Standards for Consent: The Case of U.S.
Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 459, 482 (2015).
104
Id.
100
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undertake.”105 Consent, however, raises difficult questions
concerning the nuances of an agreement and what exactly was
consented to—i.e., the terms of the contract.106 Specifically, consent
to use force in a host State operates as an agreement where parties
intend to be legally bound and governed by international law.107
With respect to FAWs and consent, States who do not
possess the technological capabilities to develop these weapons are
provided with an extra sense of security by consenting to another
State’s use of these weapons in their territory. States can now agree
to the specific computer algorithms for deploying these weapons.
They can have a direct input on the territory for which these
weapons will monitor, and can agree to a threat level determination
that deploys force. In fact, FAWs will eliminate the human
determination that is a cause of conflict between the States using
force and the host State. Instead, both parties will have a direct
involvement and can be held accountable if FAWs result in
unjustified killings—since both were at the drawing board and
together made the determination on when and how to target
enemies. In contrast, one of the concerns with invoking consent as
a means to use force, is that it expands the U.N. Charter’s justified
uses of force because these provisions, as drafted, are quite limited
in scope.108 But this concern focuses on the general prohibition on
the use of force and self-defense, rather than focusing on the U.N.
Charter’s principal purposes of “maintain[ing] international peace
and security”109 and “develop[ing] friendly relations among
nations.”110 Ultimately, by allowing parties to agree to FAWs, with
the elimination of the human aspect from either State, States may be
capable of developing better relations and security within the host
State.
105

Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law
Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 26–27 (2013).
106
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 20.
107
Deeks, supra note 105, at 18.
108
Justin M. Ndichu, “Plugging a Leak”: A Preliminary Step in
Establishing a Nuanced Approach to Govern Intervention in the New Age, 49
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 222 (2016).
109
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
110
Id. ¶ 2.
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D. Hot Pursuit
Hot pursuit, evolving from customary international law and
later codified,111 is a doctrine that grants the “constructive extension
of jurisdiction against suspect foreign vessels that flee from law
enforcement action within a jurisdictional zone.”112 The application
of this doctrine primarily focuses on allowing governmental law
enforcement assets to pursue vessels that have violated maritime law
within the jurisdictional waters of a coastal State.113 The crux of this
doctrine is that the pursuit “must be hot and continuous.”114 The
term “hot” provides for an immediacy requirement regarding the
commencement of pursuit and requires that the pursuit must quickly
follow the committed infringement.115
Although more
idiosyncrasies exists, a brief definition is necessary to allow for a
discussion on the application of hot pursuit to FAWs.
States can justify using FAWs to pursue terrorists that crossborders into other States by applying the doctrine of hot pursuit (if
the doctrine is expanded and adapted to sovereign land).116
Specifically, to employ FAWs under the justification of hot pursuit,
a target must have been physically present in a State, committed an
act that violated the laws or regulations of that State, and the FAW
adapted to the situation based on its own intelligence, without
human intervention, and targeted or pursued the perpetrators into
another State.117 The question remains: will FAWs be capable of
identifying this scenario and then thereafter, targeting and chasing
the correct perpetrator? Although concerns remain for invading
111

Vasilios Tasikas, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Doctrine of Hot
Pursuit: A New Era of Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, 29
TUL. MAR. L.J. 59, 68–69 (2004) (noting that the customary international law
doctrine of “hot pursuit” was codified in Article 111 of the 1982 U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea).
112
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
113
Id. at 71.
114
Id. at 78 (quoting R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE
SEA 151 (1983)).
115
Id.
116
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 18–19.
117
See id. (discussing this application of hot pursuit to the facts of the
United States pursuit of terrorists crossing the border of Afghanistan into
Pakistan).
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sovereign land based on this doctrine, FAWs will be capable of swift
action, satisfying the “immediacy requirement,” and, therefore,
limiting the threat to sovereignty of the invaded State. Indeed,
FAWs may be capable of eliminating the chain of command, human
delay, and other limitations, that will allow for quick and decisive
action to eliminate the pursued threats.
In contrast, there are two constraints that limit FAWs as a
viable justification for international use of force when applying the
hot pursuit doctrine.118 These include: (1) static targets, such as
camps and operation centers; and (2) expanding the hot pursuit
doctrine to sovereign land.119 These two constraints, however, do
not outweigh the benefits of employing FAWs under the narrow
legal justification of hot pursuit. First, to counter the static target
argument, FAWs will not have a legal basis for solely invading a
sovereign to attack enemies where no unlawful act occurred. In fact,
the immediate pursuit requirement will always be an element under
this doctrine. Second, applying this doctrine to sovereign land raises
the concerns of threatening a State’s sovereignty by invading its
territory; however, FAWs will be capable of swift and decisive
actions and, therefore, can be justifiable because there would be no
threat to “the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.”120
E. Ungoverned Territory
The use of FAWs in ungoverned territory is problematic and
complicated because of the difficulty in classifying an area as
“ungoverned territory.”121 Although numerous interpretations exist
for ungoverned territory, one interpretation concludes that a territory
is ungoverned where “[a] State is absent, unable, or unwilling to
perform its functions.”122 States, other than the actual host State for
118

Id. at 19.
Id.
120
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
121
Larson & Malamud, supra note 3, at 20.
122
Id. (quoting Angel Rabasa, et al., Summary, in Ungoverned
Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (2007)).
119
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which the territory exists, seek to deploy force and control over
ungoverned territory.123 This is because these areas provide a
recruiting ground and base of operations for terrorists, and
additionally, allow criminal organizations to flourish—which
possibly lead to arms trades and human trafficking.124 Ultimately,
defining an area as ungoverned, especially in territories with
established tribal traditions, poses serious challenges to a State’s
sovereignty and, therefore, State’s must be mindful of the
repercussions within the international community.125
Although the use of force is not prohibited if a territory is
truly “ungoverned,” this legal justification should be used as a last
resort for employing FAWs to target and engage enemies.126
Indeed, the question of whether a territory is ungoverned can
increase the potential of conflict and deviate from the U.N. Charter’s
principle purposes. FAWs may have a viable legal basis in the
previously mentioned doctrines, but to employ FAWs on this notion
that a territory is ungoverned raises serious international political
concerns. For example, some of the international community
question the U.S.’ determination of the Federally Administered
Tribal Region (FATA) region as ungoverned territory and attribute
its determination as “western arrogance.”127 Ultimately, a State
must not base the legality of using force on the justification that a
territory is ungoverned because of the potential of infringing on a
State’s sovereignty and the concerns of re-characterizing territories
for the sole purpose of justifying the use of force in another State.128
V. PROPOSAL FOR FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
“Any law’s strength depends on its relevance . . . if the new
technologies are creating a ‘revolution in military affairs,’ we may
well need a ‘revolution in military legal affairs.’”129 Although much
remains unknown about the full-scale deployment of FAWs, the
123

Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 21.
128
Id. at 21–22.
129
SINGER, supra note 6, at 407.
124

21

FIGUEROA ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

166

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/26/19 10:34 PM

[Vol. 31:1

possibility that FAWs may improve the U.N. Charter’s goal of
maintaining peace and security should be carefully analyzed before
a blanket prohibition is imposed on the entire class of weapons.130
This does not mean that the twentieth-century laws have to be
jettisoned completely to adapt to today’s conflicts and means of
war.131 Simply because the laws of war have been outdated, does
not mean they should be abolished, as these “old laws” codified
some of the most important international law principles.132 Instead,
this Article proposes for an open discussion within the U.N. to
address the benefits and concerns, prior to the full-scale use or
prohibition of this technology. As referenced earlier, the laws of
war lag behind the means of war. FAWs are different because
enough information currently exists to develop the appropriate
governance modules in a timely and proactive manner.133
An initial policy proposal is to realize the inevitability of the
proliferation of FAWs, address the benefits, and then establish a
formal international binding agreement to regulate the uses of these
weapons. A State using force against another State or non-State
actors will always be present because conflict is certainly
unavoidable. Thus, States must recognize that FAWs will minimize
civilian casualties; FAWs will also be more accurate and precise,
and will save military personnel. 134 These benefits must be part of
the discussion as opposed to focusing on the lack of human
intervention. In contrast, in all out deployment is not the solution
because fears exist regarding the hacking of FAWs when deployed,
130

See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3.
SINGER, supra note 6, at 407.
132
Id.
133
Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 314.
134
See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 35, at 281 (concluding it would
be irresponsible to prohibit autonomous weapons because “such weapons may
offer the possibility of attacking the enemy with little risk to the attacker” and
noting an outright ban would “have the effect of denying commanders a valuable
tool for minimizing the risk to civilians and civilian objects in certain attack
scenarios”); see also William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The
Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1139, 1166 (2013) (noting that “[d]iminished political tolerance for
military casualties has . . . made [today’s] drones more politically palatable,
because they keep soldiers farther from the battlefield and preserve the lives of
American servicemen”).
131
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the lack of State accountability, and the unpredictability of the wide
scale use of these weapons. With these benefits and fears, this
Article recognizes that there is always an obligation for States to
develop technologies in fear that another State will be ahead. But
that obligation must be countered by a successful system of good
governance.135
A system of good governance involves “clearly defined and
articulated expectations.”136 The first proposed regulation focuses
on a limitation of FAWs by establishing clearly defined rules on
what activities FAWs can observe, what locations they can observe,
and the duration of such observation.137 Specifically, these
regulations would create an “observational stage” where FAWs
would be restricted to certain hotspot locations and be required to
comply with a defined observational period before carrying out a
“kill mission.”138 By defining the location and requiring an
observational period, these regulations would directly affect how
“the machine’s capacity [] orient[s] itself, the number and type of
actions weighed when the machine decides, and the eventual act
carried out.”139 For example, a State could be authorized, either by
a U.N. resolution or any applicable justification, to deploy FAWs in
certain locations to observe terrorist activities for a permitted time
frame, which would allow FAWs to collect a large amount of data
and detail, and then based on the data collected, decide to carry out
the targeted killing. This process of a lengthier and detailed
observation would allow the FAWs’ final decision to be more
discriminating and accurate.140
The next proposed regulation focuses on the FAWs’ “kill”
determination.141 Regulations are necessary to establish program
135

Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 314.
Id. (emphasis in original).
137
Marra & McNeil, supra note 134, at 1180–81.
138
Id.
139
Id. (emphasis omitted).
140
Id.
141
See Hammond, supra note 31, at 662 (noting that “[t]he ability of
[autonomous weapon systems] to operate without human oversight gives rise to
[an] accountability problem” in international law); Thompson Chengeta,
Accountability Gap: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Modes of Responsibility
in International Law, 45 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 49 (2016) (recognizing that
136
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constraints for FAWs that will restrict the weapon from deploying
unauthorized and illegal lethal force.142 Specifically, States must
agree on detailed threshold determinations (e.g., proportionality and
distinction thresholds), which are programed into FAWs, requiring
the weapon to process and evaluate the information assuring that the
attack is proper under the programmed operational orders.143 This
means that FAWs, prior to being fully employed in the battlefield,
must have programmed algorithms with agreed upon thresholds, and
then determine if their use of force actions are lawful under the
preprogrammed constraints.144
By allowing threshold
determinations, the FAWs become more restrictive and accountable
when deploying lethal force.145
The two proposed regulations are merely a starting point for
regulating these new technologies. There must be a binding
agreement between States and the U.N.’s involvement. Specifically,
domestic checklists and balances are not enough to combat the
proliferation of FAWs. Indeed, global collaboration is a necessity.
When States have open discussions, however, it is unrealistic to
expect major world contributors to sign off on a complete weapon
prohibition.146
In fact, the superior approach to proliferation of FAWs is
establishing limitations on technological development and agreeing
to specific rules governing their use, rather than attempting a
complete prohibition.147 For example, the Oslo Convention of 2008,
“[t]he challenges that are posed by [autonomous weapon systems] as far as
accountability of violations [of International Law] is concerned must be taken
seriously”).
142
Christopher P. Toscano, supra note 62, at 218.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
See John Lewis, The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous
Weapons, 124 YALE L.J. 1309, 1317–18 (2015); see also UN meeting targets
‘killer
roots’,
UN
NEWS
(May
14,
2014),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/05/468302-un-meeting-targets-killer-robots.
In May of 2014, U.N. officials met to discuss a full prohibition on FAWs, with
the top U.N. official of the meeting declaring: “You have the opportunity to take
pre-emptive action and ensure that the ultimate decision to end life remains firmly
under human control.” Id.
147
Lewis, supra note 146, at 1317.
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which sought to ban cluster munitions, illustrates the World’s
reluctance to sign off on a complete ban of these weapons.148 In this
convention, several States, including China, Russia, and the U.S.,
failed to sign the agreement; the reasons for their denial: military
necessity.149 This example, among other failed weapon ban
agreements, illustrates that States are unlikely to agree on a
complete ban on weapons they currently intend to use or develop.150
The superior approach when recognizing the previous
failures associated with attempting a complete weapon prohibition,
is to consider the components and framework of an effective
regulatory scheme.151 For example, landmines, which are already
regulated under international law, share important similarities with
FAWs.152 With respect to the regulation of landmines, the Amended
Protocol provided the following framework: (1) policies to
safeguard the proliferation of landmines; (2) a geographical and
spatial criteria for where these weapons could be deployed; (3) a
definition of indiscriminate use; (4) specific military objective
requirements; and (5) additional protections on the governance of
landmines.153 Landmines are a highly technical weapon system and
therefore, the Amended Protocol establishes guiding precedent
regarding the future regulations of FAWs.154 With the guidance of
the Amended Protocol, an ideal regulatory scheme would build from
the effectiveness of this regulation, and to the extent ambiguities
remain, States must encourage open discussion to evolve
comprehensive ideas directed towards the emergence of new,
relevant international law for FAWs.155

148

Id. at 1317–18.
Id. at 1318 n.50.
150
Id. at 1317–18.
151
Id. at 1318–19.
152
Id. at 1319.
153
Id. at 1319–20; see Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.
154
Lewis, supra note 146, at 1322.
155
See Crootof, supra note 52, at 1895 (“In the absence of intentional
regulation, the unchecked development of autonomous weapon systems may well
pose a significant threat to fundamental humanitarian principles and protections—
and, by extension, to human lives.”).
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In the absence of international regulation, FAWs will remain
unchecked and raise significant threats to the current international
use of force legal framework.156 This Article, however, emphasizes
the importance of opening discussion to legitimize the need for
international attention and regulation for FAWs.157 Entities—
including States, the U.N., developers, and manufacturers—must
begin working toward a regulation that focuses on “clearly defined
and articulated expectations.”158 This can be accomplished by
considering the proposals of this Article: (1) establish clearly
defined rules for FAWs’ observation periods and permitted
locations; (2) establish agreed upon thresholds for FAWs’
operational orders; and (3) reframe previously effective regulations
to create a workable regulation for FAWs. Ultimately, States and
the U.N. must not squander this opportunity to finally allow the laws
of war to dictate new technology in the battlefield instead of new
technology dictating the laws of war.159
VI. CONCLUSION
FAWs will, indeed, revolutionize warfare and the
application of international use of force laws. Now, is the time for
the debate to shift to developing a legal framework to adapt to this
technology. As technology continues to advance, political, legal,
and cultural considerations will act as a safeguard for the full-scale
deployment of FAWs.160 This, however, must not be the only
safeguard in our international legal system. This Article proposes
for a full-fledged discussion within States and the U.N. to finally
adopt a legal framework that coincides with the advancement of
technology. Warfare is part of the human condition, but we,
together, can pursue better principles to better shape and regulate the
156

See id. at 1896 (“It is still possible to proactively employ legal means
to channel how this new technology develops and is used, but the window of
opportunity is closing. The time to act is now.”)
157
See id. at 1897 (“States and other parties interested in the governance
of this new weaponry can begin working toward it now.”).
158
Marchant et al., supra note 5, at 290.
159
See SINGER, supra note 6, at 387 (“New technology has often moved
faster than the laws of war.”).
160
Marra & McNeil, supra note 134, at 1185.
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practice of war. Indeed, “[o]ur robotic creations are creating new
dimensions and dynamics for our human wars and politics that we
are only now just beginning to fathom.”161 With this insight, we can
begin to create a legal framework that works to limit the resort to
using force, or in the alternative, works to improve accountability
for when there is unlawful use of force. We as humans, “fear what
[we] don’t know,” and change is coming in warfare, but it is time to
take preventive measures and finally allow the laws of war to dictate
the development and use of FAWs.162
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SINGER, supra note 6, at 431.
Id. at 436.
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